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Abstract
We experimentally study the in￿uence of induced group identity on the determination of
prices and beliefs in a small market game. We create group identity through a focal point
coordination game. Subjects play a three-person bargaining game where one seller can sell an
indivisible good to one of two competing buyers under four di￿erent treatments varying the
buyer-seller constellation. We ￿nd evidence of in group favoritism on the buyer side. However
we do not detect a lower ask prices for in-group sellers for in group buyers, indicating that
in-group favoritism is in favor of the more powerful market participant.
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Trade between members of groups that di￿er in non-economic, but social characteristics is ubiq-
uitous in almost every society. Social characteristics should not matter in a market setting where
subjects try to maximize their gains from trade. However, discrimination between groups is ob-
served frequently in market settings such as housing markets (Yinger, 1995), car markets (Gold-
berg, 1996), consumer markets (Yinger, 1998), and labor markets (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2004). Explanations for this phenomenon are either statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972) or
taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1957), where negative stereotypes or negative tastes toward
another group lead to unequal treatment. We are interested how group identity in￿uences the de-
termination of prices and expectations on the demand and supply side in a simple market setting
abstracting from statistical discrimination.
Early work in social psychology by Tajfel and Turner (1979) developed a theory on group identity
to understand the psychological basis for intergroup relations and discrimination. People de￿ne
themselves ￿ among other ￿ as member of particular groups in a society that may have behavioral
consequences when two members of di￿erent groups deal with each other. As noted by Akerlof
and Kranton (2000) group identity plays an important role in economic decision-making, hiring
decisions and bargaining. They propose a utility function including identity associated with dif-
ferent social norms and categories. They apply this model to analyze phenomena like gender
discrimination, economics of poverty and social exclusion.
Following this literature, we focus on a nearly minimal group design to isolate the e￿ect of statistical
discrimination that can not be excluded with natural groups. In our experiment one seller is trying
to sell an indivisible good to one of the two buyers. The seller states her willingness to accept
2
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 043separately for each buyer and the buyers state their willingness to pay. If the willingness to pay
of both buyers is lower than the willingness to accept there is no trade. If both buyers are over
their respective willingness to accept, the seller can choose to whom to transfer the good. This
trade happens under four di￿erent treatment conditions: (1) Complete strangers, subjects have
not interacted in the coordination game, (2) both buyers and the seller are in-group members,
i.e. they have interacted in the coordination game (3) only one buyer is in-group (the other is
out-group) and the seller is in-group, and (4) where the two buyers are in the in-group and the
seller is out-group. Additionally, we elicit expectations of behavior over buyers and sellers. Our
contribution is to directly compare markets where discrimination via group membership is possible
versus markets where this is not.
Our results reveal that in-group buyers who compete with an out-group buyer o￿er signi￿cantly
more compared to a stranger’s framework. We also ￿nd that in-group seller expect in-group fa-
voritism from their partner, i.e. expect a higher o￿er. However, we do not ￿nd evidence of
discriminatory behavior of the seller bargaining with an in-group and an out-group buyer simul-
taneously. In-group favoritism appears to be asymmetric and depending on the market power of
the actor: The seller as the more powerful market participant expects favorable treatment from
in-group members, but she is not willing to reciprocate by accepting lower o￿ers from in-group
buyers.
A large body of experiments in social psychology and increasingly in economics studies the in￿uence
of group identity on behavior.1 Thereby, experimental research relies on both natural identities (e.g.
Goette et al., 2006) as well as arti￿cially induced groups (e.g. Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis,
1A detailed review of the literature in social psychology on social identity can be found in Charness et al. (2007)
and Chen and Li (2009).
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Studies dealing with natural groups identify signi￿cant e￿ects on behavior. For instance, involving
members of two rival business schools, Kramer et al. (1995) ￿nd that responders are more willing to
accept unfair o￿ers by in-group proposer than the same o￿er made by someone from the out-group
in a bargaining game. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) show that identifying natural groups with
distinct ethnic a￿liation in the Israeli Jewish society leads to a discrimination of outsiders in both,
the trust game and the ultimatum game, but not in the dictator game. Falk and Zehnde (2007)
identify statistical discrimination and in-group favoritism in sequential trust games using natural
groups divided into residential districts in Z￿rich. More precisely, they ￿nd that the magnitude of
investments depend on the district responders live in and that people trust strangers from their
own district signi￿cantly more than strangers from other districts. More recently, Leider et al.
(2009) explore group identity and social ties in the context of dictator games and ￿nd evidence of
in-group favoritism, i.e. dictators give nearly 52 percent more to friends (in-group) in a real-world
social network than to random strangers (out-group).
In contrast to natural identities, using induced identities gives the researcher more control and
￿exibility over the group formation process. In an early experiment, Vaughan et al. (1981) divide
7 to 11 year old children into red and blue groups to play a simple division game and conclude
that irrespective of the age, children give more money to members of their own group than to
the other group. Charness et al. (2007) investigate the in￿uence of induced group membership
and its saliency on individual behavior in prisoner’s dilemma and battle-of-the-sexes games. In the
minimal group treatment they do not ￿nd di￿erences in the cooperation rate between in-group and
out-group members. Increasing the saliency of the groups, the authors ￿nd that group membership
signi￿cantly a￿ects individual behavior. Likewise, the introduction of arti￿cially induced groups by
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Heap and Zizzo, 2009). Chen and Li (2009) explore the e￿ect of social identity across a variety of
games and ￿nd that subjects are more altruistic towards in-group members.
While previous experiments have demonstrated the impact of group identity in various types of
games, only a few papers deal with the in￿uence of group identity in market settings. For example
Ball et al. (2001) investigate the impact of social status on market prices and earnings. They
￿nd that players randomly assigned to a high-status group earn signi￿cantly more of the surplus,
regardless of whether they are buyers or sellers. Recently, Li et al. (2010) study the impact of group
identity on partner selection and price o￿ers in oligopolistic markets. They conduct a bargaining
game with multiple proposers and responders and ￿nd that in-group sellers are more likely to make
o￿ers to in-group buyers. The authors point out that group identity may not be important in big
markets where buyers and sellers act anonymously but may be more important in markets with a
small number of sellers and buyers and, as we argue, infrequent trade.
There are several studies investigating interaction of three people: . G￿th and Van Damme (1998)
examine the e￿ect of the presence of an observer in the ultimatum game. Holm (2000) conducts
a three person game with natural groups and looks at coalition formation and sharing within
a coalition. He ￿nds that Swedish subjects when having the choice between a partner with a
Swedish or a foreign name, choose the person with the Swedish name signi￿cantly more often.
However, within the coalition he does not observe a di￿erence in the distribution of resources. In a
recent study, Bauernschuster et al. (2009) explore how competition and group identity a￿ect trust
and trustworthiness. They ￿nd that trustees react to competition among in-group and out-group
investors by lowering return ratios. Closest to our study is the work by Tremewan (2010) who
conducts a three-person ￿divide the dollar￿ game and investigates the e￿ect of group identity on
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in the out-group earn less, because of being more often excluded from the coalition.
Our design is applicable to a variety of small markets: For example licensing markets, where
only one seller (licensor) and a few buyers (licensees) bargain in the market. First, licensing is
comparable to a matching procedure: Among all ￿rms interested in licensing a technology, the ￿rm
that submits at least as much as the licensor asks and at the same time the highest o￿er becomes
the exclusive licensee. Second, the number of potential licensees is limited since inventions are
usually at an early stage and market success is uncertain (Contractor, 1981; Jensen and Thursby,
2001). Thus, social ties among actors may play an important role in these markets. For instance,
it might be that some common experiences already exist between participants at the time of
negotiation due to prior collaboration, whereas other participants have no common experience or
relation to the in-group and hence belong to the out-group.
A couple of caveats are worth mentioning: Dealing with within-group manipulations might en-
courage subjects’ behavior into a direction the experiment is designed to test for ￿ so to invoke an
experimenter demand e￿ect (EDE, Zizzo, 2010). To reduce this problem we formulate our instruc-
tions as neutral as possible. Moreover, we do not announce our objectives during the experiment,
i.e. key goals and claims the experimenters actually try to achieve. Additionally we use the focal
point game to avoid an obvious group formation process (Mehta et al., 1994). Furthermore, we
are aware of the fact that for belief elicitations a lump-sum payment is not incentive compatible.
Nonetheless, a lump-sum payment is justi￿ed by several studies which report that incentivization
does not signi￿cantly improve stated beliefs (Sonnemans and O￿erman, 2001; Dufwenberg and
Gneezy, 2000; Guarino and Huck, 2006).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next Section we describe our experimen-
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the results. In Section 5 we conclude and discuss the implications of our ￿ndings.
2 Experimental Design
In order to identify the in￿uence of group identity on the determination of buyers’ o￿ers and
sellers’ claims in a market setting, we implement four distinct experimental treatments. Each
treatment consists of three parts and a concluding questionnaire which are computerized using
zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). In Part 1 of the experiment ￿ which is identical for all four treatments
￿ we introduce group identity using a three-person coordination game. This coordination ensures a
common, positive, experience among the upcoming in-group members. In Part 2 of the experiment,
subjects are rearranged to groups of three subjects according to the four di￿erent treatments to
participate in a three-person bargaining game which di￿ers in its group composition. To strengthen
group feelings we introduce wording and color assignments to identify in-group and out-group
members in the subsequent treatments. In this bargaining game one seller and two buyers have
to bargain about an indivisible good. Stage 1 of the three-person bargaining game corresponds
to a one-shot game, as subjects know that the second part of the experiment consists of 3 stages
but the exact information about the content of stage 2 and stage 3 is disclosed at the end of the
￿rst bargaining game. That means that after completing the ￿rst bargaining game subjects are
informed that in stage 2 and 3 the three-person bargaining game will be repeated keeping group
membership and group identity constant but assigning new roles to the subjects. Every subject
in each treatment plays once as a seller and twice as a buyer. The third part concluded the
experiment with a lottery choice game and a ￿nal questionnaire.
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are referred to as in-group members. Subjects who are matched with subjects, with whom they do
not play the ￿rst part together, are referred to as out-group members. Figure 1 gives a graphical
overview of the treatments where S stands for the seller and B stands for the buyer. In treatment 1
(All-out) all subjects are out-group members - represented by white circles, in treatment 2 ( All-in)
all subjects belong to the in-group pictured with gray circles, in treatment 3 ( One-buyer-out) one
buyer and the seller belong to the in-group while the other buyer belongs to the out-group which
is represented with two gray and one white circles. In treatment 4 ( Seller-out) both buyers belong
to the in-group while the seller belongs to the out-group pictured with two gray and one white
circles. All four treatments are conducted in each session.
Part 1: Coordination game and group formation In the ￿rst part of the experiment groups
of three subjects are formed randomly. All subjects participate in a three-person coordination
game played within each group to establish common experience among the randomly formed group.
Subjects of a group, referred to as partners, have to choose a meeting point in Paris (France), either
the Ei￿el Tower or the Centre Georges Pompidou (see Bauernschuster et al., 2009). Coordination
is successful if all three players of a group pick the same meeting point. In case of a successful
coordination the group receives an amount of 1.50 ¿ which is split equally among the subjects of the
group. In case of disagreement the group receives 0¿. After the coordination game, subjects are
informed about their own and their group-mates’ choices, the outcome of the coordination and the
pro￿t of the group. After completing the coordination game in the ￿rst part, groups are rearranged
according to the four treatments and subjects receive information on the group composition. To
strengthen in-group membership we additionally use wording and color assignment. We assign a
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Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3 
One shot  Repeated 
All out




  Previous coordination 
One buyer out 
  2 of 3 with coordination 
Seller out 
  2 of 3 with coordination 















Note: S=Seller, B=Buyer. The arrows indicate how subjects changed roles over
the stages.
color (blue) to all members of the in-group and inform participants about this color assignment.
Subjects, who are supposed to interact as out-group members, are matched with two new subjects
with whom they do not interact in the ￿rst part. We inform subjects belonging to the out-group
that they are assigned to subjects who belong to the blue group referred to as partners, who has
already collected experience in the ￿rst part together. To strengthen the out-group feeling, we
assign the color red to out-group members (see Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 2002). Group
membership, i.e. the colors and the corresponding information with whom they interacted in the
￿rst part is public knowledge to all matching-group members. We use this nearly minimal group
design in order not to confound the existence of groups with strong reciprocity motives.
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participated in a three-person bargaining game for three rounds where two buyers and one seller
negotiate for an indivisible good. The bargaining process proceeds as follows: All subjects of
a matching-group make their individual o￿ers simultaneously and in private. The seller has to
announce a payment request simultaneously for each of the two buyers (X 1; X2), announcing the
minimum level of acceptance in exchange for the good. On the screen of the seller the two boxes for
the payment request for each buyer are arranged vertically. The assignment of buyers to the upper
and lower boxes is randomized. At the same time each buyer states her o￿er indicating the willing-
ness to pay for the indivisible good (Y 1; Y2). Proposals and payment requests can range between
an integer value of 0 and 113 ECU (Experimental Currency Units). After all subjects con￿rmed
their proposal(s), the entry is obligatory and a renegotiation is not possible. Once all subjects have
made their decisions, the o￿er of each buyer is compared to its corresponding threshold to decide
if the good is sold and determine which buyer is successful. In case that none of the o￿ers meet the
corresponding threshold of the seller, the good is not sold. If both o￿ers are at least equal to the
threshold of the seller [(X1  Y1) _ (X2  Y2)], she has to decide to whom the good has to be sold. 2
A single buyer acquires the good if her o￿er is equal or exceeds the sellers corresponding threshold
and the o￿er of the other buyer does not [(X1  Y1 ^ X2 > Y2) _ (X1 > Y1 ^ X2  Y2)].
Subjects’ payments depend on the successful contracting. If there is no agreement on the price,
buyers’ endowment of 113 ECU is lost and all participants receive a pro￿t of zero. If the seller
concludes a contract with one of the two buyers, the seller receives buyers’ winning o￿er. The
successful buyer receives the di￿erence between 113 ECU and the price o￿ered to the seller. The
2To the best of our knowledge all prior studies investigating responder competition use a random draw to
determine the winner (see Grosskopf, 2003). To check for potential discrimination in a bargaining process we allow
for a choice of the seller in case that both buyers reach its corresponding threshold. However, we are aware that
such a design could lead to payment requests of the seller close to zero.
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rounds keeping group membership and group identity constant but assigning new roles to the
subjects. Thus every subject plays once as a seller and twice as a buyer. The ￿rst stage of the
bargaining game corresponds to a one-shot game. Subjects in the experiment are unaware of the
fact that the game is repeated two more times. In all three bargaining stages, subjects do not
receive feedback about the prior bids as well as the outcome.
At the end of Part 2, one stage has been chosen randomly for payment. In case a clear result has
been achieved, i.e. either no agreement or an agreement where one buyer meets the corresponding
threshold of the seller whereas the other does not, all subjects receive feedback immediately. In
case both buyers meet sellers’ corresponding threshold, buyers receive a message that the seller
has to choose from one of the two. The choice screen of the seller included two (colored) boxes
for each buyer next to each other which included the payment request of the seller as well as
the corresponding o￿er. The assignment of buyers who belong to the left and to the right box is
randomized. After the choice of the seller, all subjects of the group received feedback.
Belief elicitation After each bargaining stage, we elicit beliefs from each subject depending on
its role in the bargaining game. More precisely, we elicit sellers’ beliefs about the potential o￿er
from each of the two buyers as well as buyers’ beliefs about sellers’ potential payment request for
herself and for the other buyer. For the elicitation we use two di￿erent methods: First, we ask each
subject for a point estimate, i.e. subjects have to declare an integer between 0 and 113 ECU. In
a second step, we confront subjects with twelve intervals of equal size apart from the ￿rst and the
last one.3 Subjects have to state for each interval a value between 0 and 100 to specify their beliefs
3The ￿rst interval [0,10] includes 11 values whereas the last interval [111, 113] includes only 3 values. All the
other intermediate intervals include 10 values, respectively.
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all stated values have to sum up to 100, which correspond to 100 percent. 4 Thus, independent
from the role, each subject has to answer four bonus questions after each bargaining game. In
total subjects received a lump-sum payment of 1.20 ¿ for answering all bonus questions.
Part 3: Risk aversion elicitation To control for the role of risk aversion we apply a simpli￿ed
procedure of Holt and Laury (2002). 5 Subjects are presented with ￿ve di￿erent lottery choices. In
each case, subjects have the choice between a safe lottery X that pays 0.50 ¿ for sure and a risky
lottery Y that pays amounts from 0.90¿ to 1.50¿ with a probability of 0.5 and zero otherwise. In
general, more risk averse people should switch from lottery X to lottery Y at a higher stage. At
the end, one pair of lotteries is selected randomly and the decision is paid out.
3 Hypotheses
First, we are interested whether di￿erences among buyers with respect to group identity have an
e￿ect on stated o￿ers. We expect that a direct comparison of buyers in mixed groups leads to
a stronger competition between each other, resulting in higher o￿ers of both buyers compared
to situations where buyers are not distinguishable. One explanation might be that sellers are
not able to directly discriminate between the two, which might reduce the investment pressure
4Both methods ask the same question but in a di￿erent way. Whereas the ￿rst question just asks for an integer
value, the second question asks for a probability distribution. Aim of the second method is to specify subjects’
beliefs and to control for inequalities and inconsistencies. According to Delavande et al. (2008), eliciting probability
distributions should be strictly preferred to the elicitation of point expectations. Therefore we only use probability
distributions for the upcoming analyses. Furthermore, we do not incentivise belief elicitation in order not to risk
hedging problems, that may be prevalent especially in market settings (see Blanco et al., 2010).
5This procedure has previously been used by Durante and Putterman (2007).
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explanation is that in-group buyers may follow an in-group favoritism pattern. In this regard,
Robert and Carnevale (1997) analyze the impact of groups on the formulation of ultimatum o￿ers
and ￿nd that proposers more often o￿er a fair share to a member of their own group. Likewise,
Wilson (2007) conducts a dictator game with three di￿erent ethnic groups and ￿nds strong in-
group favoritism. Subjects send signi￿cantly higher economic awards to recipients from their own
ethnic groups than to recipients belonging to another group. For the case of One-buyer-out we
predict that the out-group buyer will o￿er more compared to the All-out case because of anticipated
in-group favoritism from the seller for the in-group buyer. Following these arguments, we predict:
Conjecture 1. In treatment One-Buyer-Out
(a), in-group buyers o￿er more compared to buyers in the All-Out treatment.
(b), out-group buyers o￿er more compared to buyers in the All-Out treatment.
Second, we are interested in sellers’ payment requests and whether these requests di￿er with regard
to di￿erent group identities. We suppose that in-group sellers may either demand a lower or a
higher price from in-group buyers compared to out-group buyers. On the one hand, in-group sellers
may demand lower prices from in-group buyers because of in-group favoritism. On the other hand,
opportunistic in-group sellers may take advantage of buyer’s in-group favoritism and charge in-
group buyers a higher price. Recently, Li et al. (2010) have observed that in-group sellers charge
in-group buyers a higher price compared to out-group buyers. We therefore formulate following
hypothesis for the case that sellers can directly distinguish between both buyers:
Conjecture 2. In treatment One-buyer-out, in-group sellers payment requests are higher for in-
group buyers than for out-group buyers.
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to di￿erent group identities. Several studies elicit beliefs about other players’ actions such as
contributions in public good games (e.g. O￿erman et al., 1996) and investments in trust games
(e.g. Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000). In our experiment sellers might hold heterogeneous beliefs
about expected o￿ers of buyers considering di￿erences in group membership. In-group sellers might
expect that their partners from the ￿rst part of the experiment make them a higher o￿er compared
to the out-group buyer. This would be in line with the impact of in-group favoritism (Tajfel, 1982)
and common identity as a major determinant for transactions in markets (Ben-Porath, 1980). The
following relationship is expected:
Conjecture 3. In treatment One-buyer-out, in-group sellers expect a higher o￿er from in-group
buyers than from out-group buyers.
The same argument (in-group favoritism) also holds for beliefs of buyers about potential payment
requests of the seller. If buyers di￿er with respect to their group identity they may expect di￿erent
payment requests for themselves and for their counterpart. According to in-group favoritism, in-
group buyers may expect a lower price for themselves than for the out-group counterpart whereas
out-group buyers may expect the other way round. We therefore predict the following:
Conjecture 4. In treatment One-buyer-out, In-group buyers expect a lower threshold whereas
out-group buyer expect a higher threshold for themselves.
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4.1 Implementation
We conducted the experiment in June 2010 at the laboratory of the Friedrich Schiller University
Jena. All participants were undergraduate students from a broad variety of disciplines, excluding
students from economics and psychology, recruited via ORSEE (see Greiner, 2004). In total we
conducted 10 sessions with a total of 168 subjects with 18 subjects per session. 6 Before the
experiment subjects received the same basic instructions in print (see appendix A). At the end of
each session, part 1 and one randomly picked stage from part 2 were paid according to subjects’
decisions. Additionally, subjects received a lump-sum payment of 1.20 ¿ for all bonus questions
and further 0.56¿ on average from the lottery game. Each subject received a show-up fee of 2.50 ¿.
On average, subjects earned in total 7.28¿, with a minimum payment of 4.20 ¿ and a maximum
payment of 14.50¿. All rewards within the experiment were handled in ECU (Experimental
Currency Unit), where 1 ECU corresponds to 0.08 ¿.
4.2 Group induction
In part 1 ￿ the coordination game ￿ 99.4 percent of all subjects chose the Ei￿el Tower as a meeting
point in Paris. This leads to a successful coordination in 98,2 percent of all groups: Only one
6 In two sessions we had to restrict the number of subjects to 12 due to no-shows. In these cases the ￿rst
three treatments were conducted. In general, treatment All-out and All-in were run with 1 group each per session
and treatment One-buyer out and Seller-out were run with 2 groups each per session, except for 1 session where
treatment Seller out was run with 4 groups to balance the number of executed treatments.
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larger compared to the study of Bauernschuster et al. (2009).
4.3 Bargaining game: First stage
In this section we use the results from the ￿rst period of the market game. First, we look at the
di￿erences of stated o￿ers depending on group identity and treatments. To test Conjectures 1a
and 1b, o￿ers of in-group and out-group buyers in treatment One-buyer-out are compared with
pooled o￿ers of buyers in treatment All-out, All-in, and Seller-out, respectively.7 Figure 2 presents
in total six bar plots where the upper three depict comparisons of in-group buyers’ o￿ers and the
lower three show comparisons of out-group buyers’ o￿ers with pooled o￿ers in treatments All-out,
All-in, and Seller-out, respectively.
In-group buyers in treatment One-buyer-out o￿er on average 90.83 ECU, whereas pooled buyers
in treatment All-out o￿er on average 79.15 ECU, a di￿erence of nearly 15 percent. The Mann-
Whitney two sample statistic shows that the di￿erence is statistically signi￿cant (p-value=0.048) 8.
It implies that in-group buyers who compete with out-group buyers o￿er signi￿cantly more com-
pared to the stranger’s framework. Additionally, testing mean o￿ers of in-group buyers in treatment
One-buyer-out with pooled mean o￿ers in treatment Seller-out (80.6 ECU), In-group buyers in
treatment One-buyer-out o￿er signi￿cantly more compared to pooled buyers in treatment Seller
out (p=0.069).
In the next step we compare mean o￿ers of out-group buyers in treatment One-buyer-out with
7The reason why we can pool buyers’ o￿ers in these treatments is because both buyers do not di￿er from each
other. In both cases buyers have either no social identity or are both in-group members. Therefore, we pool the
o￿ers to get more observations for the comparison between treatments.
8We report test statistics from the Mann-Whitney test throughout the rest of the paper if not indicated di￿erently
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i.e. the di￿erence between treatments All-out and One-buyer-out (p=0.988), All-in and One-buyer-
out (p=0.453), and One-buyer-out and Seller-out (p=0.985) do not show any signi￿cant di￿erences
between stated o￿ers. Overall, the results suggest that in-group buyers tend to o￿er signi￿cantly
more in treatment One-buyer-out compared to treatments All-out and Seller-out, respectively. For
out-group buyers no signi￿cant di￿erence is observed. Our results con￿rm Conjecture 1a, i.e. in-
group buyers in treatment One-buyer-out o￿er signi￿cantly more compared to o￿ers in treatments
All-out. However, we do not ￿nd support for Conjecture 1b that out-group buyers in treatment
One-buyer-out o￿er a signi￿cantly larger amount to the in-group seller compared to mean o￿ers
in treatment All-out.































































Note: The upper three graphs compare in−group buyers average offers in treatment ’One buyer out’ with
pooled average offers in treatment ’All out’, ’All in’ and ’Seller out’, respectively. The lower three graphs
compare out−group buyers average offers in treatment ’One buyer out’ with pooled average offers in
treatment ’All out’, ’All in’ and ’Seller out’, respectively.
To test Conjecture 2 we analyze payment requests of in-group sellers in treatment One-buyer-out.
Therefore, we look at the mean payment requests for both the in-group and the out-group buyers,
respectively. In-group sellers on average demanded 78.16 out of 113 ECU from in-group buyers
compared to 76.61 out of 113 ECU from out-group buyers. The Wilcoxon signed rank test suggests
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group sellers treat buyers, who belong to either the same or to the other group di￿erently, which
contradicts Conjecture 2. In Figure 3 we depict the o￿ers from the out-group and the in-group
buyers for treatment One-buyer-out in cases where both o￿ers met the corresponding threshold
of the seller . We see that most of the time with two exceptions, the highest o￿er was chosen.
These o￿ers were mainly made by in-group buyers. In the case of ties, the seller chose the in-group
agent which is an indication of in-group favoritism. Surprisingly, in one case the in-group seller
chose the partner although the in-group buyer o￿ered less than the out-group buyer. However,
this di￿erence is not signi￿cant.
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Now we turn to sellers’ expectations about buyers’ potential o￿ers in stage 1 among the 4 treat-
ments. For this we use the elicited probability distributions over o￿ers (see Table 2). We are
especially interested in the beliefs of the seller in treatment One-buyer-out to test Conjecture 3
where both buyers di￿er within their group a￿liation. Additionally, we investigate di￿erences in
beliefs between treatments.
Table 1: Sellers’ elicited expectations about buyers’ potential o￿ers

















Note: This table presents the mean expectations of the seller di￿erentiated with respect to both buyers,
standard errors in italics, number of observations in parentheses.
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compared to an expected mean o￿er of 71.1 ECU from out-group buyers. The Wilcoxon signed
rank test con￿rms that in-group sellers’ expectations di￿er signi￿cantly from each other (p=0.064).
This result con￿rms Conjecture 3 and suggests that in-group sellers expect on average a favorable
o￿er from in-group buyers.
Comparing sellers’ expectations about in-group buyers’ potential o￿ers in treatment One-buyer-out
with pooled beliefs of treatments All-out (p=0.090), All-in (p=0.188), and Seller-out (p=0.163),
results suggest a signi￿cant di￿erence between treatment All-out and One-buyer-out. Sellers in
treatment All-out expect a mean o￿er of 62.69 ECU from pooled buyers, whereas in-group sellers
in treatment One-buyer-out expect a mean o￿er of 76.43 ECU from in-group buyers. This di￿er-
ence might be driven due to in-group favoritism, i.e. in-group sellers expect on average a higher
o￿er from their partner. Another explanation may be that in-group sellers expect a stronger com-
petition among buyers who di￿er in their group identities in treatment One-buyer-out compared
to treatment All-out where no direct di￿erence is observable. With regard to sellers’ expectations
about out-group buyers’ o￿ers, we do not ￿nd any signi￿cant di￿erences in treatment One-buyer-
out compared to pooled beliefs in treatments All-out (p=0.335), All-in (p=0.599) and Seller-out
(p=0.910), respectively.
Expectations of buyers
We now analyze buyers’ expectations about sellers’ potential payment requests for oneself and for
the counterpart. Table 2 summarizes buyers’ mean expectations split up for the 4 treatments.
First, comparing in-group and out-group buyers’ expectations about sellers’ potential payment
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is true matching in-group and out-group buyers’ expectations (p=0.506) about seller’s potential
payment request for the counterpart. Hence, we do not ￿nd any signi￿cant di￿erences of payment
request for oneself and for the counterpart among in-group and out-group buyers within treatment
One-buyer-out which contradicts Conjecture 4.
Table 2: Buyers’ mean expectations about payment requests for oneself and for the counterpart
Buyers expectations
Identity 1st buyer Identity 2nd buyer Total
Treatment exp. oneself exp. other exp. oneself exp. other exp. oneself exp. other
All-out out-group out-group
73.02 76.05 72.75 72.75 72.88 74.40
6.06 6.77 3.71 3.77 3.46 3.79
(10) (10) (20)
All-in in-group in-group
74.79 77.00 62.76 67.24 68.75 72.12
6.61 6.37 2.94 4.05 3.78 3.84
(10) (10) (20)
One -buyer-out in-group out-group
80.89 82.17 76.98 77.42 78.94 79.80
4.06 4.17 4.35 4.83 2.95 3.17
(18) (18) (36)
Seller-out in-group in-group
72.96 71.31 73.67 73.32 73.32 72.32
5.16 4.97 3.37 3.51 3.03 3.01
(18) (18) (36)
Note: 1st buyer corresponds to the left buyer whereas 2nd buyer corresponds to the right buyer in Figure
1, mean expectations of buyers with respect to sellers payment request for oneself (exp. oneself) and for
the counterpart (exp. other), standard errors in italics, number of observations in parentheses.
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counterpart di￿er in treatment One-buyer-out for each buyer. We are interested if both buyers
who di￿er with regard to their group identity expect on average a di￿erence between payment
requests for oneself and for the counterpart. Analyzing expectations we do not observe a signi￿cant
di￿erence in beliefs (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p=0.225) for in-group buyers about payment
requests for oneself and for the counterpart. For out-group buyers’ expectations (Wilcoxon signed
rank test, p=0.627) we receive a similar result. This implies that buyers do not expect to receive
signi￿cantly di￿erent payment requests from the seller.
To get a more precise picture, di￿erences of expectations across treatments are analyzed. In this
regard buyers’ expectations in treatment One-buyer-out are compared with pooled expectations
in treatment All-out, All-in, and Seller-out, respectively. The Mann-Whitney test suggests that
in-group buyers’ expectations for themselves (80.9 ECU) in treatment One-buyer-out di￿er signif-
icantly from pooled expectations (68.8 ECU) in treatment All-in (p=0.037). All other di￿erences
among treatments are not signi￿cantly di￿erent. This implies that in-group buyers expect a sig-
ni￿cantly larger payment request for themselves and therefore ￿erce competition in treatment
One-buyer-out compared to treatment All-in, where both buyers belong to the in-group.
Moreover, we compare in-group buyer’s expectation for the counterpart with pooled expectations
in treatment All-out, All-in and Seller-out, respectively. Expected payment requests for the coun-
terpart (82.2 ECU) in treatment One-buyer-out do not di￿er signi￿cantly from pooled expectations
for the counterpart (74.4 ECU) in treatment All-out (p=0.169). However, comparing in-group buy-
ers expectations in treatment One-buyer-out (82.2 ECU) with pooled expectations in treatments
All-in (72.1 ECU) and Seller-out (72.3 ECU), respectively the Mann-Whitney test con￿rms a sig-
ni￿cant di￿erence between them (p=0.075 and p=0.040, respectively). These results suggest that
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request compared to treatments where di￿erences among buyers cannot be directly observed. With
regard to out-group buyers’ expectations, i.e. expected payment requests for oneself and for the
counterpart we do not ￿nd signi￿cant di￿erences between treatments.
4.4 Regression results
To check whether the above ￿ndings of buyer’s o￿ers are consistent we analyze all three stages of
the bargaining game including covariates. We focus on buyer’s behavior due to the structure of
the data: For each subject we have two observations as a buyer and one observation as a seller.
Table 3 presents GLS regressions with individual random e￿ects and robust standard errors. 9 The
regressors are buyers’ o￿ers to acquire the indivisible good. We include indicator variables which
state whether or not group members, i.e. seller and both buyers belong to the in-group. In our
analysis we try to identify how buyer’s o￿er is in￿uenced by its own and teammates group a￿liation
in camparison to buyers’ o￿er in treatment All-out which form the omitted reference group.
In all regression Models (1-3) the group constellation interacts with the Stage variable to control
for learning e￿ects caused by role reversals. Furthermore, we include variables to control for session
e￿ects, gender e￿ects, risk aversion and experience. More precisely, session is a categorical variable
transformed into a factor variable, gender is a binary variable and is equal to one for female, risk
aversion is a ordinal variable and ranges from 1 to 6, where 1 corresponds to risk averse and 6 to
risk loving, and experience is a binary variable which measures whether or not subjects already
participated in an experiment.
9We estimated all models with GLS random e￿ects and Tobit random e￿ects. Since the estimated results are
very similar, we report only GLS random e￿ects. Further results are available upon request.
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o￿er controlling for stage e￿ects. The results indicate a signi￿cant positive e￿ect for in-group
buyers who bargain with in-group sellers and compete with out-group buyers. In-group buyers in
treatment One-buyer-out o￿er signi￿cantly more compared to buyers who belong to the out-group
and interact with out-group sellers and out-group buyers. Among the buyers in treatment One-
buyer-out, coe￿cients of those belonging to the in-group di￿er signi￿cantly from those belonging
to the out-group (p=0.011). In Model 2 we additionally control for session e￿ects, gender, risk
aversion, and experience. Results in Model 2 con￿rm that in-group buyers who bargain with
in-group sellers and compete with out-group buyers o￿er signi￿cantly more compared to o￿ers
of the reference group. The coe￿cients of treatment One-buyer-out suggest that in-group and
out-group buyers di￿er signi￿cantly from each other (p=0.002). Finally, in Model 3 we include
buyers’ expectation as an additional explanatory variable. Results are qualitatively similar to
those obtained in Models 1 and 2, respectively. Surprisingly, after controlling for expectations we
￿nd that in-group buyers who interact with in-group sellers and compete with another in-group
buyer (treatment All-in) o￿er signi￿cantly more compared to the control group All-out.
Overall, the results of the regression Models 1-3 suggest that in-group buyers who bargain with
an in-group seller and compete with an out-group buyer o￿er signi￿cantly more compared to the
case where buyers bargain with an out-group seller and compete with an out-group buyer. These
results con￿rm Conjecture 1a. This suggests, that the behavior of a buyer does not only depend
on the own group identity but also on the group identity of other members and therefore the entire
group constellation.
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Buyers’ o￿ers
(1) (2) (3)
in-group seller  in-group self  in-group counterpart
111 5.599 5.975 10.282*
(5.180) (5.802) (5.983)
101 -1.511 -1.829 -2.192
(4.995) (5.463) (5.071)
110 9.872* 12.238** 10.446*
(5.396) (6.181) (5.884)








Stage yes yes yes
Session yes yes
Experience yes yes
Constant 79.34*** 58.36*** 28.64***
(4.121) (8.374) (9.604)
Di￿erence in coefs
In-group and out-group buyer in treatment One buyer out -11.38** -14.07*** -12.64***
Observations 336 296 296
Number of subjects 168 148 148
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** denote signi￿cance at the .10, .05, and .01
levels, respectively. The coe￿cients of the interaction terms show the di￿erence of behavior of a
buyer of a particular type (in or out-group) in the respective buyer-seller constellation compared
to the baseline treatment All-out. A zero indicates that the respective person belongs to the out
group, while a 1 indicates in-group. In model 2 and 3 we had to exclude twenty observations due
to ambiguous choices in the 3rd part of the experiment. The variable experience indicates whether
the person has participated in previous economic experiments (not in this one).
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Using ￿eld data it is di￿cult to investigate bargaining behavior among involved parties and espe-
cially among participants who di￿er in their group identities. We conducted a laboratory experi-
ment to investigate the in￿uence of group identity on the behavior of subjects in a market setting
where two buyers and one seller bargain for an indivisible good. We ￿nd that in-group buyers
o￿er signi￿cantly more in situations where direct discrimination is possible and out-group buyers
do not, although it might be expected due to anticipated in-group favoritism. Furthermore, we do
not ￿nd evidence that market pressure extracts all the rents from the consumers, independent of
the treatment.
The most interesting ￿nding is that sellers expect in-group favoritism, but do not reciprocate
this by o￿ering lower ask prices for in-group buyers. We may explain this ￿nding that in-group
favoritism is asymmetric and depends on the market power of the actor. A more powerful market
participant ￿ the seller ￿ expects favorable treatment, but she is not willing to accept lower o￿ers
from in-group members. This opens a path of further research whether market (or other) power
leads to asymmetric in-group favoritism in favor of the more powerful.
Future research may also focus on the way how di￿erent levels of experience (cf. Li et al., 2010)
in￿uence subject’s behavior. Furthermore, repeated interactions among subjects with prior ex-
perience or group identity might lose its weight through ongoing interactions. To investigate a
negotiation which is more related to a licensing process, sellers and both buyers have to be un-
aware about the potential bene￿t of the indivisible good.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 043A Printed instructions (English translation)
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation!
In this experiment - ￿nanced by the German Research Foundation (DFG) - you can earn money, de-
pending on your own decisions and the decisions of the other participants. It is therefore important
to read the instructions carefully! If you have any questions at any time during the experiment,
please press the ￿pause‘ key on the keyboard. We will come to you and answer your questions
immediately and in privacy. Please pose your question quietly. All participants of this experiment
receive the same printed instructions. Further information displayed on your screen are only in-
tended for the respective participant. Please do not look at the screen of other participants and
do not communicate with them. If you o￿end against these rules, we are unfortunately required
to expel you from the experiment. Please switch of your mobile phone.
General schedule: This experiment will take approximately 60 minutes. It consists of four
parts and a ￿nal questionnaire.
The experiment:
1. part: You will take part in a game with two other players. Detailed description are displayed
on your screen.
2. part: In the second part you will participate in a negotiation game. Two buyers and one seller
are negotiating about a indivisible good. The roles are matched randomly. The task of the seller
is to sell the single good and the task of the buyers is to buy the indivisible good. Please note
that the o￿ered entity can only be bought by one of the buyers. For the purchase of the good an
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The negotiation process: During the negotiation process either buyers and seller get into action:
the seller will note down the minimum price he is asking from each buyer. At the same time each
buyer notes down her o￿er. To determine who will purchase the good the demand of the seller is
compared to the respective o￿er. If both o￿ers do not match the seller’s demand the good won’t
be sold. In this case, all parties end up with 0 ECU from this part of the experiment. If both o￿ers
match the seller’s demand or are higher, the seller may choose between the two o￿ers. If only one
matches the good will automatically be sold to the respective buyer.
part 3 and 4: The third and forth part of the experiment will be explained to you in the course
of the experiment.
Payment: Show up fee (2,50 ¿) + Pro￿t of the ￿rst part (1 ECU = 0,08 ¿) + Pro￿t picked
randomly from the second, third or forth part. The conversion rate is 1 ECU = 0,08 ¿. Your
earning will be privately paid to you after you ￿lled in the questionnaire. No other participant will
know how much you have earned.
Further schedule: After you have read the instructions carefully, please wait for the other
participants and then start with the computer program on your screen.
Good luck!
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Figure 4: Coordination screen
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 043Figure 5: Request screen of the in-group seller for both buyers
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 043Figure 6: O￿er screen of the in-group buyer
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 043Figure 7: Decision screen of the out-group seller
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